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що його породжують. Існуюча сьогодні конструкція правового 
визначення тероризму досить громіздка, складна і утруднює ква-
ліфікацію кримінально-правових діянь, що мають схожі кваліфі-
каційні ознаки, проте тероризмом не є. По-друге, потрібна подаль-
ша розробка на міжнародно-правовому рівні базових принципів 
боротьби з тероризмом. По-третє, необхідна розробка модельно-
го міжнародного закону про боротьбу з тероризмом. По-четверте, 
ефективність боротьби з міжнародним тероризмом немислима без 
створення міжнародної системи моніторингу тероризму на осно-
ві обов’язкової передачі відповідної інформації від національних 
урядів, регіональних і міжнародних організацій, що беруть участь 
у різних формах боротьби з тероризмом, її накопичення і аналі-
зу в спеціально створеному інформаційному банку. По-п’яте, при 
організації масштабної боротьби з тероризмом і транснаціональ-
ною злочинністю, необхідна розробка міжнародно-правових основ 
проведення міжнародних антитерористичних операцій із закрі-
пленням обов’язковості санкції Ради Безпеки ООН на здійснення 
і контроль за їх проведенням. По-шосте, слід також вжити заходів 
щодо найшвидшої ратифікації членами міжнародного співтовари-
ства конвенцій по боротьбі з тероризмом і подальшого внесення 
ними потрібних змін у національні законодавства. Необхідне скли-
кання спеціальної сесії Генеральної Асамблеї ООН по боротьбі з 
тероризмом і ухвалення нею відповідних рішень
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UNIvERSAL JURISDICTION IN ABSENTIA: 
mEANINGLESS OR REASONABLE DISTINCTION?
When talking about universal jurisdiction one has always to bear 
in mind that until this very moment there is ’no generally accepted 
definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional or customary 
international law’ in words of the Judge Van Den Wyngaert expressed 
in her Dissenting Opinion in the International Court’s of Justice Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of the 11th of April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Belgium). The lack of precise definition and scope 
of the notion may explain the lasting discussion on the matter. The part 
of it concerns the presence of a suspect on the territory of the Forum 
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State as a prerequisite for exercise of such jurisdiction. While some 
claim that the traditional explanation of universal jurisdiction is that 
some crimes are regarded as so heinous that every State has a legitimate 
interest in their repression, others insist that in general principle in order 
to exercise universal jurisdiction a State has to meet the requirement 
of the presence of a suspect within its territory. While the latter is 
sometimes called ’ordinary’ or ’conditional’ universal jurisdiction, the 
former is known as ’pure universal concern jurisdiction’, or ’pure’, 
or ’true’, or ’absolute’ universal jurisdiction but most commonly it is 
referred to as universal jurisdiction in absentia. The core meaning of 
such jurisdiction is absence of any nexus between the Forum State and 
the case in question, even the absence of a suspect within its territory. 
In such cases the only link which can be claimed is the international 
nature of the crimes committed, which justifies the right of any State 
to investigate. The reason why universal jurisdiction in absentia can be 
regarded as a purified form of universal jurisdiction by some scholars is 
that it also can be regarded as a kind of actio popularis. Since it allows all 
States constituting the international community and interested in ending 
impunity for gross violations of human rights to prosecute and punish 
alleged perpetrators notwithstanding the total lack of any nexus between 
them and the crime, it thus allows to act in the interest of the whole 
international community, what makes universal jurisdiction in absentia 
an action for the good of the international society. Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans and Buergenthal, for instance, in the aforementioned Arrest 
Warrant Case in their Joint Separate Opinion seemed to regard universal 
jurisdiction in absentia as the original form of universal jurisdiction 
by reference to the Lotus principle (which is however disputable) and 
denying the presence of the suspect as its prerequisite.
Therefore universal jurisdiction in absentia is quite widely 
understood as a form of jurisdiction whose lawfulness is to be considered 
in its own right and thus as distinct from universal jurisdiction per se. 
However, the question may arise as on what grounds it is possible to 
distinguish so called ordinary universal jurisdiction and universal 
jurisdiction in absentia. Some may claim that the difference between 
them is simply temporal, precisely at which stage the presence of a 
suspect must be obtained. Others may find the underlying difference 
in the fact that ordinary universal jurisdiction is recognized only for a 
State in which a suspect is present, and universal jurisdiction in absentia 
is attributable to virtually any State in the world since it requires no 
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nexus between the crime and the State claiming jurisdiction. Moreover, 
some scholars may even argue that the distinction between the two is 
meaningless, since a State which initially only has universal jurisdiction 
in absentia, may eventually obtain ordinary universal jurisdiction by 
obtaining the custody of a suspect who is located abroad as the result 
of its arrest warrant or extradition request. Finally, for some the major 
difference is that the two have different rationales and status under 
conventional and customary international law, i. e. different legal status 
and the realm of their acceptance among States. The last point is worth 
more comprehensive studying.
As to the incorporation in conventional international law ordinary 
universal jurisdiction has much more firm position. While many 
contemporary treaties and conventions prescribe universal jurisdiction 
in the form of not even a right but more – an obligation upon States 
where a suspect is present and also provide such States with discretion 
in deciding whether to extradite or exercise jurisdiction itself, in 
contrast, universal jurisdiction in absentia is not explicitly prescribed by 
any convention (the major exceptions to the rule are found only in the 
Geneva Conventions). Moreover, Judge Guillaume in the same Arrest 
Warrant Case in his Separate Opinion proclaimed that ’[u] niversal 
jusrisdiction in absentia is unknown to international conventional law.’
Therefore universal jurisdiction in absentia is of the exclusive 
character, since its exercise is not a direct consequence of the 
expansion of national jurisdiction under conventional international law. 
Though, such jurisdiction was recognized, for instance, by the U. S. 
courts in the Demjanjuk Case and by the German Federal Supreme 
Court in the Sokolovic Case, universal jurisdiction in absentia is not 
widely recognized by the States and, thus firmly supported in neither 
conventional nor customary international law. The only factor which 
promotes its exercise is the recognition of the interest of the international 
community. So in most of their domestic laws and practices States are 
reluctant to expand their jurisdiction beyond that which they are obliged 
to do under specific treaties or conventions and consequently to enact 
the relevant legislation.
On the other hand, however contemporary conventional 
international law contains wordings that conventions do ’not exclude 
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law’ (Art. 
4(3) of the Torture Convention), what means that the lack of evidence 
of universal jurisdiction in absentia in conventional international law 
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does not lead to the conclusion about the prohibition of such jurisdiction 
under international law either.
Concerning its position in customary international law both can 
be found support and opposition of universal jurisdiction in absentia. In 
favor of the former A. Cassese, for instance, provides with two rationales 
for universal jurisdiction in absentia: the first is the extreme extent of 
gravity and magnitude of the crime; and the second is compliance with 
the principle of sovereign equality of States and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the State where the crime has been prepared. However 
what remains questionable is State acceptance and opinio juris on these 
rationales. While in some states there is domestic law on universal 
jurisdiction in absentia like e. g. in Spain, Belgium, Germany, Italy, in 
others domestic courts have accepted universal jurisdiction in absentia, 
e. g. the USA in the Demjanjuk Case.
Nevertheless except for the support there are also strong arguments 
as to the opposition of universal jurisdiction in absentia. The law and 
practice of States prove the tendency to limit universal jurisdiction 
to cases in which a suspect is present on their territory, e. g. Canada, 
France, Switzerland and Denmark. Moreover, for the States allowing 
universal jurisdiction in absentia, it may provoke some opposition 
from the States involved in the case (this is exactly what happened to 
Belgium after the aforementioned Arrest Warrant Case, when Belgium 
amended its domestic law towards abolishing universal jurisdiction in 
absentia). In the stream of this argumentation A. Cassese also criticizes 
the approach of understanding universal jurisdiction as tantamount to 
universal jurisdiction in absentia, claiming that ’it would be contrary 
to the logic of current state relations to authorize any state of the world 
to institute criminal proceedings (commence investigations, collect 
evidence, and lay out charges) against any foreigner or foreign state 
official allegedly culpable of serious international crimes.’ Furthermore, 
the possible arbitrariness in determination of the Forum State may 
also cause concerns of rights’ protection of a suspect. In contrast to 
the ordinary universal jurisdiction, in the case of exercising universal 
jurisdiction in absentia suspects cannot foresee which State will claim 
jurisdiction, i. e. they will neither be able to know which State will issue 
an arrest warrant in the future, and thereby to which State they may be 
extradited, nor under which national law they will be prosecuted, what 
kind of punishment may be imposed, and in which State they will have 
to serve sentence.
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In conclusion despite the lack of extensive conventional 
incorporation and support among states even the most innovative and 
disputed jurisdiction, such as universal jurisdiction in absentia, is not 
prohibited under international law unless it clashes with its other rules 
or principles. As the logic flows if universal jurisdiction is permissible 
then its exercise in absentia is permissible too, though which question 
remains without an answer is whether the latter is desirable. This 
issue will remain unresolved and unsure until either a corresponding 
case comes to an international tribunal, or an international treaty, or 
a recognized series of guidelines is accepted. At the moment the only 
statement which does no raise doubts is that universal jurisdiction, 
including universal jurisdiction in absentia, is envisaged to serve 
the interests of the international community as a whole by replacing 
impunity with accountability, thus being extremely important as a tool 
of fostering progressive development of international law towards 
human rights and justice.
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сПіВВіДнОшЕннЯ кРиМінАлЬнОгО ПРАВА 
укРАїни і МіжнАРОДнОгО кРиМінАлЬнОгО 
ПРАВА. ПРОцЕс гАРМОнізАції ТА АДАПТАції
Правова система, яка існує сьогодні в Україні, складалася 
протягом тривалого часу під впливом різноманітних факторів істо-
ричного, політичного, соціального, економічного та іншого харак-
теру. Зазначене цілком стосується і кримінального права України 
як частини його цілісної правової системи. Як і в кримінальному 
законодавстві будь-якої держави, у кримінальному законодавстві 
України змішані елементи національно-самобутнього з елемента-
ми запозиченого чужого – це законодавство завжди розвивалося 
під певним впливом кримінального законодавства інших держав, 
а також під впливом міжнародного права, який з часом ставав усе 
більш потужним.
Ні для кого не є таємницею, що забезпечення законності, 
рівності, судової незалежності, адекватності реакції на вчинений 
злочин та її швидкості є основними в системі владовідносин, що 
формують кримінально-правові норми. Узгодження національних 
